A Relational Governance Perspective on the Politics of China’s Social Credit System for Corporations by de Jonge, Alice
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 
Volume 44 
Number 2 Summer 2021 Article 3 
Summer 2021 
A Relational Governance Perspective on the Politics of China’s 
Social Credit System for Corporations 
Alice de Jonge 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Alice de Jonge, A Relational Governance Perspective on the Politics of China’s Social Credit System for 
Corporations, 44 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. Rev. 111 (2021). 
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol44/
iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of 
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu. 
Upload 3-A Relational Governance Perspective 4/15/2021 3:58 PM 
 
111 
A Relational Governance Perspective on the Pol-
itics of China’s Social Credit System for  
Corporations 
 




This paper uses a comparative method to analyze China’s evolving So-
cial Credit System (SCS) for corporations, and the political discourse used 
to portray SCS as a governance tool facilitating Corporate Social Responsi-
bility (CSR) with Chinese characteristics. A modified relational governance 
framework is used. The importance of relationships (guanxi) in the Chinese 
business context is that it makes a modified form of the relational governance 
perspective uniquely appropriate. This study also draws upon evolving liter-
ature examining the role of artificial intelligence (AI) in international busi-
ness contexts. 
China’s corporate SCS is explicitly designed to evaluate corporate be-
havior through a “scoring” system of “points.” A comparative lens highlights 
the similarities, and crucial differences, between this and recent efforts to 
develop concepts of non-financial capital giving value to “social capital” in 
business contexts.  
This paper makes a unique contribution to the comparative governance 
literature by providing unique comparative insights into China’s corporate 
SCS, and by setting these insights in the context of a world increasingly dom-
inated by two competing models of AI-driven organizational governance - 
one controlled by western technology giants and driven by primarily com-
mercial motives—the other shaped and driven by the politics of China’s 
Party-state institutions.  
 
Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge? 
Where is the knowledge we have lost in information? 
TS Eliot – The Rock  
 
  Alice de Jonge lectures in international law and comparative law at Monash Business 
School, Melbourne Australia. She has published widely on issues of corporate governance 
under both international law and Chinese law. 
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I. Introduction 
 
China’s Social Credit System (SCS) is a high-tech, data-driven system 
which has the potential to shape corporate behavior, but not necessarily for 
the better. This paper seeks to understand China’s SCS using a comparative 
lens. It takes the view that “a comparative perspective is not only a necessary 
response to the challenges we collectively face but also a proactive strategy 
to learn from each other’s experiences to formulate appropriate responses to 
the global challenge of big data in an increasingly complex social world.”1 
By adopting a comparative law perspective, this paper argues that a modified 
relational governance framework provides a useful theoretical tool for un-
derstanding how corporate behavior is being shaped by China’s SCS. The 
relational governance model acknowledges the presence of politics in deci-
sion-making processes and recognizes that the boundaries between state, 
business, and civil society are far from clear, and in some state contexts the 
three may be closely entwined. This is very much the case in China, making 
the modified relational governance model eminently suited for adaptation to 
the Chinese context.  
The relational governance framework takes as its starting point Mid-
ttun’s2 identification of three main sets of governance actors—government, 
industry, and civil society—and the processes of exchange between them. 
Albareda et al.3 and Lozano et al.4 build upon this framework in their analysis 
of the role of government and governance structures play in driving public 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policy. Both Scherer and Palazzo,5 
and Fairbrass, and Owens6 recognize the role of politics and power in the 
government-business-civil society relationships that shapes CSR. Fairbrass 
 
 1. Min Jiang & King-Wa Fu, China Social Media and Big Data: Big Data, Big Brother, 
Big Profit?, 10 POL'Y & INTERNET 372, 389 (2018). 
  2. Alte Midttun, Realigning Business, Government and Civil Society. Emerging Embed-
ded Relational Governance Beyond The (Neo) Liberal and Welfare State Models, 5(3) CORP. 
GOVERNANCE (SPECIAL ISSUE) 159 (2005). 
 3. Laura Albareda et al., The Government’s Role in Promoting Corporate Responsibil-
ity: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and UK from the Relational Perspective, 6(4) CORP. 
GOVERNANCE 386 (2006) [hereinafter Albareda et al., Promoting Corporate Responsibility]; 
Laura Albareda et al., The Changing Role of Governments in Corporate Social Responsibility: 
Drivers and Responses, 17(4) BUS. ETHICS EUR. REV. 347 (2008). 
 4. JOSEP M. LOZANO ET AL., GOVERNMENTS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
(2008). 
 5. Andreas Georg Scherer & Guido Palazzo, Toward a Political Conception of Corpo-
rate Responsibility: Business and Society Seen from a Habermasian Perspective, 32(4) ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 1096 (2007). 
 6. Jenny Fairbrass & Anna Zueva-Owens, Conceptualising Corporate Social Responsi-
bility: ‘Relational Governance’ Assessed, Augmented, and Adapted, 105(3) J. BUS. ETHICS 
321 (2012). 
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& Zueva-Owens7 also point to failures in existing relational governance anal-
yses to capitalize upon insights from the political science literature on gov-
ernance and public policy. This failure has resulted in a blindness towards 
the role of politics and power play in shaping relationships between govern-
ment, business, and civil society. Such blindness makes relational govern-
ance understandings of CSR developed in Western contexts inappropriate 
for understanding CSR in different socio-political contexts without signifi-
cant adjustment. Fairbrass and Zueva-Owens, therefore, developed a revised 
model of relational governance embodying “a more complex understanding 
of the relations between the three sets of actors.”8 
This paper adds to the Fairbrass and Zueva-Owens model of relational 
governance theory by drawing upon social capital theory. Social capital the-
ory is seen as particularly relevant to an understanding of China’s SCS. First, 
because of the ways in which it attributes value to relationships in society, 
governance, and business. Second, because of its use of discourses of trust. 
Both social capital theory and China’s SCS see trustworthiness as inherently 
valuable.9  
The first two sections of this paper explain the methodological and the-
oretical frameworks employed, with a particular focus upon why relational 
governance and social capital theory are relevant lenses through which west-
ern scholars can begin to understand China’s SCS. The third and fourth sec-
tions of this paper then examine the workings of China’s SCS, and the ways 
in which that system operates to politicize the value of trustworthiness. The 
paper concludes by recognizing that China’s other major 21st century strate-
gic initiative—the Belt and Road Initiative—is ensuring that the reach and 




The relational governance model focuses on how government, business, 
and civil society shape and influence a firm’s social and environmental be-
havior.10 This model offers a useful framework for understanding how gov-
ernment, business and civil society drive public policy approaches to CSR.11 
Recent efforts to understand CSR within a relational governance framework 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 332. 
 9. Jürgen Grote & Matteo Bonomi, Making and Breaking Social Capital: The Paradox 
of China’s Social Credit System, DIALOGUE OF CITIZENS RSCH. INST. (May 28, 2018), 
https://doc-research.org/2018/05/making-and-breaking-social-capital-the-paradox-of-chinas-
social-credit-system/ (Ger.). 
 10. Midttun, supra note 2. 
 11. Albareda et al., Promoting Corporate Responsibility, supra note 3; LOZANO ET AL., 
supra note 5. 
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often neglect the role of politics and power in shaping government-business-
civil society relationships. For this reason, this paper uses a comparative 
methodology to modify the relational governance model in its application to 
China’s SCS.12  
Comparative analysts have sought to understand how different govern-
ance systems shape CSR.13 In America, CSR remains primarily a matter of 
corporate discretion and the market place. In Europe, the European Union 
(EU) and national governments play a more active role; while in East Asia, 
traditions of industrial paternalism persist in government efforts to control 
the shape and direction of CSR.14 The comparative approach used in this 
paper allows for the analysis of different roles played by society, economy, 
and politics in shaping CSR in the Chinese context and more westernized 
CSR environments respectively. As Van Hoecke15 has noted, the analytical 
comparative method is particularly “useful for understanding very different 
legal relations and conceptual frameworks in other cultures.”16 Like other 
comparative methodologies, however, it “cannot be carried out without some 
minimum law-in-context approach.”17 
Sometimes “comparing” is considered to be a “method” in its own right 
and is called “the comparative method” without further explanation or con-
crete guidelines. Van Hoecke’s close analysis of the literature identifies six 
different methods for comparative research: the functional method;18 the 
structural method;19 the analytical method;20 the law-in-context method;21 
the historical method, and the common-core method.22 The analytical 
method is used in this study. Its power lies in its emphasis on identifying 
differences and commonalities between legal systems with their different re-
lationships or bundles of “rights” and “obligations” (legal duties). The ana-
lytical comparative method is focused upon identifying the underlying es-
sence of respective rights/duties-obligations and their correlating duties-
obligations/rights.23 Van Hoecke emphasizes the contextual nature of all 
comparative analysis. For present purposes, this means that a “law-in-
 
 12. Fairbrass & Zueva-Owens, supra note 6. 
 13. Jean-Pascale Gond et al., The Government of Self-Regulation: On the Comparative 
Dynamics of Corporate Social Responsibility, 40(4) ECON. AND SOC’Y 640 (2011) (U.K.). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Mark Van Hoecke, Methodology of Comparative Legal Research, 12 L. & METHOD, 
Dec. 2015, at 1 (Neth.). 
  16. Id. at 16. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 9. 
 19. Id. at 11. 
 20. Id. at 13. 
 21. Id. at 16. 
 22. Id. at 18-19. 
 23. Van Hoecke, supra note 15, at 13. 
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context” approach, which recognizes that law always operates within a dis-
tinct historical, political and socio-economic context, and informs the com-
parative lessons drawn throughout the paper.  
 
B. Adapting the Relational Governance Framework Using the 
Comparative Method 
 
There are various examples of government initiatives seeking to shape 
CSR policies—both public and private. In Western markets, supra-national 
and inter-government efforts have emerged primarily from Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and EU-based initiatives, 
including the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporations,24 the OECD 
due diligence guidance for responsible business conduct,25 the European 
Business Network on Corporate Sustainability and Responsibility,26 and EU 
Directive 2014/95/EU on non-financial reporting.27 Global initiatives in-
clude the Global Compact,28 the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), and the 
United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.29  
Governments have also sought to facilitate the relationship between 
business and civil society, such as the Business in the Community (BITC) 
UK initiative and the social and environmental reporting requirements of 
France’s Grenelle II Act. Governments have even provided a variety of tools 
to support civil society efforts to shape CSR initiatives, including ranking 
and scoring indices developed by private actors. These indices include web-
sites like Foreign Trade Online’s blacklist database30 and CSRHub’s ratings 
and sustainability database;31 “ratings” tools on various travel and hospitality 
websites; and non-governmental organization (NGO) investigation and re-
porting initiatives (e.g., Baptist Aid Ethical Fashion Report).  
 
 24. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, (Sept. 29, 2011), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264115415-en.  
 25. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], OECD Due Diligence Guidance for 
Responsible Business Conduct, (2018), https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/OECD-Due-
Diligence-Guidance-for-Responsible-Business-Conduct.pdf. 
 26. THE EUR. BUS. NETWORK FOR CORP. SUSTAINABILITY & RESP., 
https://www.csreurope.org/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2021) (Belg.). 
  27.  Council Directive 2014/95, of the European Parliament (Oct. 22, 2014). 
 28. U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, https://www.unglobalcompact.org (last visited Feb. 15, 
2021). 
 29. U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights (2011), https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusi-
nesshr_en.pdf. 
 30. B2B Supplier/Buyer Blacklist (SBBL), FOREIGN TRADE ONLINE, https://www.foreign-
trade.com/blacklist/a (last visited Mar. 13. 2021). 
 31. Search Ratings – CSR Report, CSRHUB, https://www.csrhub.com/csrhub/ (last vis-
ited Mar. 13, 2021). 
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There are even industry-led initiatives such as the Voluntary Principles 
on Security and Human Rights,32 the Extractive Industries Transparency In-
itiative,33 and the finance sector’s Equator Principles34 that fill institutional 
and legal voids by providing an “implicit” understanding of what is required 
for business social legitimacy.35 The finance sector has also developed in-
vestor-oriented and stock exchange-related CSR indices such as MSCI’s 
ESG indexes,36 the FTSE4Good Index Series,37 and the Dow Jones Sustain-
ability Indexes.38 These efforts to develop formal evaluation tools are sup-
plemented and influenced by media, NGOs, and activist investigations and 
communications.  
Despite the availability of these evaluation tools, they remain incom-
plete due to imperfect information because obtaining perfect information is 
unlikely and extremely costly. Moreover, the evaluation tools operate within 
a market system wherein many actors are motivated, wholly or partly, by 
profit-maximizing goals that may conflict with sustainability aims. Simi-
larly, civil society initiatives aimed at “empowering” stakeholders (e.g., con-
sumers and investors) rely on comparative tools to analyze firm behavior. 
Yet these comparative tools cannot escape the problem of viewpoint subjec-
tivity, and all are limited by less than complete information.  
The Western metrics used to shape CSR stand in contrast to China’s 
approach to CSR policy because the latter is firmly shaped towards a variety 
of policy objectives by  Communist Party state institutions. For this reason 
some see “CSR as a form of government.”39 Civil society has been important 
in shaping the direction of public CSR policy by raising awareness of CSR 
failures and increasing public concern over CSR scandals such as food and 
drug safety failures, and environmental damage.40 While it may not be 
 
 32. VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES FOR SECURITY & HUMAN RIGHTS, https://www.voluntary-
principles.org (last visited Feb. 15, 2021). 
 33. THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, http://eiti.org (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2021). 
 34. THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, https://equator-principles.com (last visited Feb 15, 2021). 
 35. Gond et al., supra note 13, at 646. 
 36. MSCI Environmental, Social and Governance Indexes, MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL 
INT’L, https://www.msci.com/our-solutions/esg-investing/esg-indexes (last visited Feb. 15, 
2021). 
 37. FTSE RUSSEL FOR GOOD NEWS INDEX SERIES, https://www.ftserussell.com/prod-
ucts/indices/ftse4good (last visited Feb. 15, 2021). 
 38. DOW JONES SUSTAINABILITY INDICES, https://www.spglobal.com/esg/csa/indices/in-
dex (last visited Feb. 15, 2021). 
 39. Gond et al., supra note 13, at 646. 
 40. Alex L. Wang, Explaining Environmental Information Disclosure in China, 44 
ECOLOGY L. Q. 865 (2018); Andreas Fulda et al, New Strategies of Civil Society in China: A 
Case Study of the Network Governance Approach, 21 J. OF CONTEMP. CHINA 675 (2012); 
Samson Yuen, Friend or Foe?: The Diminishing Space of China’s Civil Society, 2015(3) 
CHINA PERSP. 51 (2015) (H.K); Jennifer Hsu & Reza Hasmath, The Local Corporatist State 
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accurate to declare that civil society “has been conspicuously absent as a 
driver of CSR in China,”41 it remains true that the role of Chinese civil soci-
ety in shaping CSR is itself subject to, and controlled by, government man-
date.42 Authoritarian control of the CSR agenda in China can be seen as sup-
plementing the imperfect information made available through market-based 
CSR mechanisms. It does this by establishing expensive bureaucratic and 
detailed information collection and investigation processes with regulatory 
backing. But just like surveillance capitalism,43 surveillance socialism44 has 
never been completely objective in its decision-making processes. Not only 
is the nationalist agenda of the SCS itself subjective, but it remains impossi-
ble to eradicate discretionary space or bias from the system completely. On 
 
and NGO Relations in China, J. OF CONTEMP. CHINA 516 (2014); Jude Howell, Civil Society, 
Corporatism and Capitalism in China, 11 J. OF COMP. ASIAN DEV. 271 (2012). 
 41. Gond et al., supra note 13 at 658. 
 42. See, e.g., Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Minzhengbu 
Bangongting Guanyu Yinfa “Minzhengbu 2019 Nian Lifa Gongzuo Jihua” de Tongzhi (民政
部办公厅关于印发《民政部2019年立法工作计划》的通知) [Notice of the General Office 
of the Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China on Issuing 2019 Legislative 
Work Plan], http://www.mca.gov.cn/article/gk/wj/201907/20190700018304.shtml; see 
Shehui Zuzhi Xinyong Xinxi Guanli Banfa (社会组织信用信息管理办法) [Measures for 
Administration of Information on the Credit of Civil Society Organizations] (promulgated by 
the Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Jan. 24, 2018, effective Jan. 
24, 2018) St. Council Gaz., May 10, 2018, at 24, http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/con-
tent/2018/content_5288822.htm (China); see also Wang, Yong (王勇), Draft of new regula-
tions on the registration of social organizations to be submitted to the State Council, CHINA 
DEVELOPMENT BRIEF (Aug. 13, 2019), http://chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/reports/news/draft-
of-new-regulations-on-the-registration-of-social-organizations-to-be-submitted-to-the-state-
council/; China Law Translate, Measures on the Management of the Social Organizations’s 
Credit Information, CHINA LAW TRANSLATE (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.chinalawtrans-
late.com/en/measures-on-the-management-of-the-social-organizationss-credit-information/. 
 43. See generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE 
FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2019) (“[Surveillance capitalism 
is] the unilateral claiming of private human experience as free raw material for translation 
into behavioral data. These data are then computed and packaged as prediction products and 
sold into behavioral futures markets — business customers with a commercial interest in 
knowing what we will do now, soon, and later.”); see also John Laidler, High Tech Is Watch-
ing You, HARV. GAZETTE (Mar. 4, 2019), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2019/03/har-
vard-professor-says-surveillance-capitalism-is-undermining-democracy/. 
 44. Jon Mason et al., Questioning the Scope of AI Standardization in Learning, Education 
and Training, 8(2) J. OF ICT STANDARDIZATION 107 (2020) (explaining surveillance socialism 
has a similar meaning as surveillance capitalism, with the crucial difference being that the 
final customer for detailed data derived from human and business conduct is the state, and the 
data is obtained and used for state objectives, rather than commercial purposes) (Den.); see 
also John Torpey, From Surveillance Communism to Surveillance Capitalism and Beyond, 
FORBES (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johntorpey/2019/11/08/from-surveil-
lance-communism-to-surveillance-capitalism-and-beyond/?sh=7bf7e8ea3d33.  
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the contrary, the artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure underpinning the 
SCS threatens to entrench systemic biases, in much the same way that tech-
nologies developed and used in Western systems have been shown to do.45 
 
II. Relational Governance, CSR, and Social Capital Theory 
 
Relational governance studies have sought to find a “useful, compre-
hensive theory of the firm in society.”46 In the course of this search, research-
ers have developed concepts of trust, reputation, and legitimacy as particu-
larly useful in understanding modern CSR.47 Some studies explore the 
boundaries of trust, reputation, and legitimacy using concepts such as “social 
license to operate.”48 There also exists a growing body of work recognizing 
the usefulness of the social capital concept, not least because of its rich tra-
dition of understanding why and how to give value to (evolving) relation-
ships of trust in society,49 and the role of trust in shaping CSR.50 The concept 
 
 45. E.g., Jeff Larson et al., How We Analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism Algorithm, 
PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-the-com-
pas-recidivism-algorithm; Simon Chesterman, Through a Class Darkly: Artificial Intelli-
gence and the Problem of Opacity, AM. J. COMP. L. (2020). 
46 Benjamin A. Neville et al., Stakeholder Salience Revisited: Refining, Redefining and Re-
fueling an Underdeveloped Conceptual Tool, 102(3) J. BUS. ETHICS, 357 (2011); See also 
Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), 
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corpo-
ration-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans; JENA MARTIN & KAREN E. BRAVO, 
THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LANDSCAPE: MOVING FORWARD, LOOKING BACK (2015); 
Klaus J. Zink, Stakeholder Orientation and Corporate Social Responsibility As A Precondi-
tion For Sustainability, 16(8-9) TOTAL QUALITY MGMT. & BUS. EXCELLENCE, 1041 (2005) 
(U.K). 
 47. Dirk Matten & Jeremy Moon, Reflections on the 2018 Decade Award: The Meaning 
and Dynamics of Corporate Social Responsibility, 45(1) ACAD. MGMT. REV. 7, 11 (2020). 
 48. E.g., Jinua Cui et al., Community Religion, Employees and the Social License to Op-
erate, 136(4) J. BUS. ETHICS 775 (2016); Pratima Bansal et al., The Extensiveness of Corpo-
rate Social and Environmental Commitment Across Firms Over Time, 35(7) ORG. STUD. 949 
(2014); Philip H. Kim & Mingxian Li, Seeking Assurances When Taking Action: Legal Sys-
tems, Social Trust, and Starting Business in Emerging Economies, 35(3) ORG. STUD. 359 
(2013); David Weitzner & Yuval Deutsch, Understanding Motivation and Social Influence in 
Stakeholder Prioritization, 36(10) ORG. STUD. 1337 (2015). 
 49. Frane Adam & Borut Roncevic, Social Capital: Recent Debates and Research 
Trends, 42 SOC. SCI. INFO. 155 (2003); Tristan Claridge, Social Capital and Natural Resource 
Management: An Important Role for Social Capital? (2004) (M.S. thesis, University of 
Queensland). 
 50. E.g., Chun Keung Hoi et al., Community Social Capital and Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility, 152 J. BUS. ETHICS 647 (2018); Yeon S. Ahn & Dong-Jun Park, Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Corporate Longevity: The Mediating Role of Social Capital and Moral 
Legitimacy in Korea 150(3) J. BUS. ETHICS 117 (2018); Jerry X. Cao et al., Social Capital, 
Informal Governance, and Post-IPO firm Performance: A Study of Chinese Entrepreneurial 
Firms, 134(4) J. BUS. ETHICS 529 (2016). 
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of social capital is used in this paper to provide a useful comparative contrast 
to the concept of social credit in China’s SCS. Both attribute value to social 
relationships of trust. And both use discourses of trustworthiness to explore 
the nature and extent of that value. Social capital is commonly theorized as 
a collective asset in the form of norms (values) and beliefs shared through 
social networks (relationships) of trust that facilitate collective action for 
mutual benefits.51 Social capital theory has increasingly been drawn upon by 
organizational scholars seeking to understand the how and why of analyzing 
and measuring social capital at the level of the organization, and how social 
capital may facilitate value creation by firms.52 These theoretical models are 
rooted in the belief that social relations are valuable resources.53 Investment 
in social trust, norms, and informal networks can—according to social capi-
tal theory—generate additional value for firms as much as for individuals.54  
The World Bank’s Social Capital Initiative defines social capital 
broadly to allow for the existence of harmful or damaging social capital: “the 
institutions, relationships, attitudes, and values that govern interactions 
among people and contribute to economic and social development.”55 It also 
recognizes social capital as central to the evolving role of business in society, 
and business’ contribution to sustainable development—the “process 
whereby future generations receive as much or more capital per capita as the 
current generation has available.”56 Traditionally this has included natural 
capital, physical or produced capital, and human capital as the wealth on 
which economic development and growth are based. It is now recognized 
that these three types of capital only partially determine the process of eco-
nomic growth because they overlook the how economic actors interact and 
organize themselves to generate growth and development. The missing link 
is social capital.57 
 
 51. Humnath Bhandari & Kumi Yasunobu, What is Social Capital? A Comprehensive 
Review of the Concept, 37(3) ASIAN J. SOC. SCI. 480, 480 (2009). 
 52. Janine Nahapiet & Sumantra Ghoshal, (1998). Social Capital, Intellectual Capital, 
and the Organizational Advantage, 23(2) ACAD. MGMT REV. 242 (1998); Wenpin Tsai, 
Knowledge Transfer in Intraorganizational Networks: Effects of Network Position and Ab-
sorptive Capacity on Business Unit Innovation and Performance, 44(5) ACAD. MGMT J. 996 
(2001).  
 53. Bob Kijkuit & Jef Van den Ende, With a Little Help from Our Colleagues: A Longi-
tudinal Study of Social Networks for Innovation, 31(4) ORG. STUD. 451 (2010); Christiaan 
Grootaert & Thierry van Bastelaer, Understanding and Measuring Social Capital: A Synthesis 
of Findings and Recommendations from the Social Capital Initiative 1, 7 (World Bank, Soc. 
Cap. Initiative Working Paper No. 24, 2001). 
 54. Indre Maurer et al., The Value of Intra-organizational Social Capital: How it Fosters 
Knowledge Transfer, Innovation Performance, and Growth, 32(2) ORG. STUD. 157 (2011). 
  55. Grootaert & van Bastelaer, supra note 53, at 2 n.4. 
 56. Grootaert & van Bastelaer, supra note 53. 
  57. Grootaert & van Bastelaer, supra note 53. 
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The importance of social capital is often most acutely realized when it 
is lost or damaged. Some of the more well-known instances of global firms 
incurring social capital losses include BP following the Deepwater Horizon 
oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico (2010); the Wal-Mart bribery-in-Mexico scan-
dal exposed in 2012,58 and the Volkswagen’s emissions control scandal af-
fecting its global markets from 2015.59 Loss of social capital can be industry-
wide, following exposure of systemic misconduct and irresponsibility in 
Australia’s banking and finance sector.60 It can also have political, as well as 
governance, environmental, and social aspects—such as China-linked firms 
suffering major losses due to recent politically driven social unrest in Hong 
Kong.61 The Hong Kong experience illustrates the damaging impacts of neg-
ative social capital that arise when the social cohesion upon which business 
depends to manage political risk is damaged.  
There are several possible approaches to examining the loss of value in 
organizational social capital. Wang and Li theorize corporate loss of social 
capital in terms of damage to reputation-based firm-specific advantage 
(FSAs).62 Reputation captures the value of stakeholders’ assessment of a 
firm’s overall reliability and trustworthiness in the global market.63 Reputa-
tion is an important component in building the network ties with which or-
ganization-based individuals and groups build links to other social actors, 
while trust is an important component in maintaining such ties. The concepts 
of trust, reputation, and creditworthiness are common elements at the core of 
both social capital, as discussed in Western literature, and the social credit 
 
 58. David Barstow, Wal-Mart Hushed Up a Vast Mexican Bribery Case, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 21, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/business/at-wal-mart-in-mexico-a-
bribe-inquiry-silenced.html.  
 59. Case Study: Volkswagen, REPRISK (2020), https://www.reprisk.com/news-re-
search/year:2020#volkswagen. 
 60. Final Report: Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation 
and Financial Services Industry, COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL. (Feb. 1, 2019), 
https://www.royalcommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-02/fsrc-volume-1-final-re-
port.pdf. See James Eyers & James Frost, The Four Things Hayne Changed, AUSTRALIAN 
FINANCIAL REVIEW (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.afr.com/companies/financial-services/the-
four-things-hayne-changed-20200129-p53vnr. 
 61. Kirsty Needham, Chinese Companies Targeted as Wave of Destruction Hits Hong 
Kong, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/chi-
nese-companies-targeted-as-wave-of-destruction-hits-hong-kong-20191021-p532jp.html. 
 62. Stephanie Lu Wang & Dan Li, Responding to Public Disclosure of Corporate Social 
Irresponsibility in Host Countries: Information Control and Ownership Control, 50 J. INT’L 
BUS. STUD. 1283 (2019). 
 63. E.g., Davide Fiaschi et al., Overcoming the Liability of Origin by Doing No Harm. 
Assessing Emerging Country Firms’ Social Irresponsibility as They Go Global, 52(4) J. OF 
WORLD BUS. 546 (2017); Steven L. Wartick, Measuring Corporate Reputation: Definition 
and Data, 41(4) BUS. & SOC’Y 371 (2002); Charles Fombrun & Mark Shanley, What’s in A 
Name? Reputation Building and Corporate Strategy, 33(2) ACAD. OF MGMT J. 233 (1990). 
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at the core of China’s SCS. That is not to say that trust alone can be equated 
with either social capital or social credit. As Claridge points out, “trust is a 
highly contextualized decision regarding the trustworthiness of potential 
partners, largely independent of the elements that are said to be part of social 
capital.”64 Likewise, while trustworthiness lies at the theoretical core of the 
system laid out in the 2014 Outline Plan for the SCS, the SCS as now emerg-
ing is composed of far more complex series of governance processes and 
tools than the words trust and trustworthiness normally imply.  
Social credit as now used in discussions of various aspects of the SCS 
has taken on a broad meaning more akin to “public trust,” and often trans-
lated as creditworthiness. According to the 2014 Outline plan: “Raising the 
level of creditworthiness in commercial affairs is a key part of establishing 
the social credit system.”65 Creditworthiness is seen as a basic requirement 
for effectively upholding commercial relations, lowering commercial oper-
ating costs, and effectively improving the commercial environment. Data 
collection and data analysis tools are deemed essential to achieving these 
aims.  
Similarly, Western market economy efforts to evaluate and understand 
social capital have developed several macro-level indexes and tools, includ-
ing: 
i. World Values Survey (including the European Values Survey);66 
ii. General Social Survey;67 
iii. Global Social Capital Survey;68 
iv. Index of National Civic Health in the United States; 
v. University of Minnesota Survey;69 
 
 64. Tristan Claridge, Criticisms of Social Capital Theory: And Lessons For Improving 
Practice, Social Capital Research, SOC. CAP. RSCH. & TRAINING (Apr. 20, 2018) (N.Z.), 
https://www.socialcapitalresearch.com/criticisms-social-capital-theory-lessons/. See also 
ROSALIND EDWARDS ET AL., ASSESSING SOCIAL CAPITAL: CONCEPT, POLICY, PRACTICE (2006). 
  65. Shehui Xinyong Tixi Jianshe Guihua Gangyao (2014-2020Nian) (社会信用体系建
设规划纲要（2014—2020年）) [Outline of the Plan for the Building of Social Credit (2014-
2020)] (promulgated by the St. Council, June 14, 2014, effective June 14, 2014) St. Council 
Gaz. July 10, 2014, at http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2014/content_2711418.htm 
(China). English translation available at Chinalawtranslate.com. 
  66. Ronald Inglehart et al., World Values Surveys & European Values Surveys, 1981-
1984, 1990-1993, and 1995-1997, ICPSR 2790 (Feb. 2000), https://www.cms.fss.ula-
val.ca/upload/pol/fichiers/manuel_wvs.pdf. 
 67. General Social Survey, NAT’L OP. RSCH. CTR. AT U. CHI. (2020), https://gss.norc.org/. 
 68. Deeta Narayan & Michael F. Cassidy, A Dimensional Approach to Measuring Social 
Capital: Development and Validation of a Social Capital Inventory, 49(2) CURRENT SOCIO. 
59 (2011). 
 69. Scott Chazdon et al., Developing and Validating University of Minnesota Extension’s 
Social Capital Model and Survey (U. of Minn., Oct. 2013), https://conservancy.umn.edu/han-
dle/11299/171657. 
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vi. World Bank Social Capital Assessment Tool (SOCAT); 
vii. The Human and Social Capital Protocol.70  
 
Many of these indices and assessment tools are increasingly dependent 
on artificial intelligence (AI) for data collection and analysis. Increasingly 
inter-connected and knowledge-dependent global business operations are 
also using AI in their environmental, social, and political risk analysis.71 The 
United Nations Guiding Principles outline a range of tools that can be used 
for such assessments.72 It is therefore increasingly necessary for organiza-
tions to understand what forms of data and data analysis are most compatible 
with the purposes driving the data collection— such as the desire to minimize 
the firm’s negative social and environmental externalities. When global or-
ganizations assert their desire to pursue and fulfill sustainability goals, their 
claims are often met with skeptical concerns that executive proclamations 
are more about public image building than about real change in practices on 
the ground. Internationally recognized practices and standards for measuring 
social capital and CSR more broadly are potentially an important tool for 
addressing such concerns. However, before examining the promises and per-
ils of using big data and AI in social capital and CSR evaluations, it is useful 
to provide some background to Chinese understandings of CSR.  
 
III. Background to CSR with Chinese Characteristics 
 
Since 2006, China’s Company Law (in Article 5) has included a require-
ment for all companies to “observe social morals and commercial ethics, 
persist in honesty and good faith, accept supervision by the government and 
the public, and assume social responsibility.”73 In 2006 also, the Chinese 
Communist Party at its sixth plenum of the Sixteenth Party Central Commit-
tee set the definitive requirements for companies to implement CSR as part 
of a general reinforcement to its Building Harmonious Society policy of 
2004.74 In 2008 the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission, a powerful body overseeing all central-level State-Owned 
 
 70. The Human and Social Capital Protocol, SOC. & HUM. CAP. COAL. (2019), 
https://capitalscoalition.org/capitals-approach/social-human-capital-protocol/. 
  71.  MARTIN & BRAVO, supra note 46. 
 72. UNHCR, supra note 59. See HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
(Nora Götzmann ed., 2019). 
 73. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa (中华人民共和国公司法) [Company 
Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, 
effective July 1, 1994, amended in 1999, 2004, 2005, 2013, and 2018), 336 Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong. Gaz. 790 (China). 
 74. Gond et al., supra note 13, at 650. 
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Enterprises (SOEs), required these firms to establish CSR management sys-
tems.75 State agencies have issued numerous “opinions”  and “guidelines,” 
many particularly aimed at regulating Chinese firms’ conduct abroad.76 
These measures direct firms to comply with local laws and customs, protect 
the environment, show “morality” in business dealings and fulfill their social 
responsibilities in the host countries.77  
The binding nature and practical effect of these measures remain un-
clear.78 Opinions may be deemed “soft law,” but they also reflect policies 
that the Chinese state is pursuing and form an integral part of the regulatory 
infrastructure supported by and interacting with the SCS. Big corporations 
often fail to meet the highest standards of CSR, so having government actors 
regulate compliance with CSR standards is not itself a bad thing. The prob-
lem in China is not that the state is imposing CSR on large firms, but rather 
that CSR is being defined “by the Communist Party and not by society at 
large.”79 In this manner, CSR policy in China is “understood as another tool 
of state obligation.”80  
 
 75. Yi-Chun Chen et al., The Effect of Mandatory CSR Disclosure on Firm Profitability 
and Social Externalities: Evidence from China. 65(1) J. OF ACCT. & ECON. 169 (2018). 
 76. E.g., Mimi Zou, Corporate Social Responsibility on the Belt and Road, AUSTL. INST. 
OF INT’L AFF., (Jan. 29, 2019), http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/cor-
porate-social-responsibility-belt-road/; Safeguarding People and the Environment in Chinese 
Investment, INCLUSIVE DEV. INT’L, (2nd ed. 2017), https://www.inclusivedevelop-
ment.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/2019_idi_china-safeguards-guide-final.pdf; BENOIT 
VERMANDER, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN CHINA: A VISION, AN ASSESSMENT AND 
A BLUEPRINT (World Scientific, 2014); See Shangshigongsi Zhili Zhunze (上市公司治理准
则) [Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies] (promulgated by China Securities 
Regulatory Commission., Sept. 30, 2018, effective Sept. 30, 2018), 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/zjh/201809/P020180930584077967335.pdf (China). 
English translation available at: http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/laws/rfdm/Depart-
mentRules/201904/P020190415336431477120.pdf; China Securities Regulatory Commis-
sion to Include “Party Development Work” into Corporate Articles of Publicly Traded Com-
panies, CHINASCOPE (June 15, 2018), http://chinascope.org/archives/15318. 
 77. Zou, supra note 76; INCLUSIVE DEV. INT’L, supra note 76; VERMANDER, supra note 
76; Shangshigongsi Zhili Zhunze (上市公司治理准则), supra note 76; CHINASCOPE, supra 
note 76. 
 78. Zou, supra note 76. 
 79. See Arthur Sullivan, China’s Corporate Social Credit System Spooks European Com-
panies, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.dw.com/en/chinas-corporate-social-
credit-system-spooks-european-companies/a-50200050 (quoting Steve Tsang, director of the 
SOAS China Institute at the University of London) (Ger.). 
 80. See generally Larry Catá Backer, Social Credit and Foreign Enterprises Along the 
Silk Road, Remarks Prepared for a Lecture Delivered at the Institute for East Asian Studies 
of the University of Cologne (Oct. 10, 2019), http://www.backerinlaw.com/Site/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2019/10/Social-Credit-and-Foreign-Enterprises-Along-the-Silk-Road.pdf. 
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At the vanguard of shaping CSR with Chinese characteristics is the 
Party, not least because of the major role it plays in the management of Chi-
nese SOEs.81 The Party’s Organization Department selects senior party offi-
cials as the senior managers of SOEs. An amendment to the Party’s Consti-
tution in 2017 (article 33), requires a SOEs Party Committee to be consulted 
by the enterprise’s management on all major issues.82 Over the past few 
years, there has also been an acceleration of “party-building” in private 
firms.83 Moreover, it is through its control of complex networks of relation-
ships with SOEs and private firms that China’s Party-state strategically ex-
ploits new and rapidly developing technologies, including AI, that has un-
precedented transformative effects on industry, economy, and society.84 
Regulatory control over business decision making, business life, and 
business behavior in China has now reached the stage where “CSR with Chi-
nese characteristics” has morphed CSR into a form of authoritarian govern-
ance. A key feature of this authoritarian governance is the use and extensive 
reach of a sophisticated AI-driven system for collecting and analyzing infor-
mation about every aspect of business life and behavior. So far, the CSR 
literature has neglected almost entirely the role of AI. Any attempt to exam-
ine Chinese CSR under President Xi Jinping, however, cannot ignore the 
central role of AI. 
 
IV. Digital Challenges: The Datafication and Commodification of 
Trust and Relationships 
 
A growing body of literature examines the impacts of big data analytics 
on different aspects of daily life and business operations.85 New forms of 
mass data collection and aggregation, and new forms of algorithmic inter-
pretation and predictive modelling are shifting the relationship between civil 
society, business organizations, and government in ways that are not always 
 
 81. Zou, supra note 76. 
 82. CHINASCOPE, supra note 76; Shangshigongsi Zhili Zhunze (上市公司治理准则), su-
pra note 76. 
 83. CHINASCOPE, supra note 76; Shangshigongsi Zhili Zhunze (上市公司治理准则), su-
pra note 76. 
 84. Zou, supra note 76. 
  85.  E.g., ZUBOFF, supra note 43; MICHAEL P. LYNCH, THE INTERNET OF US: KNOWING 
MORE AND UNDERSTANDING LESS IN THE AGE OF BIG DATA (2016); Rana Foroor, Big Tech Has 
Moved from Offering Utopia to Selling Dystopia, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2019, 
https://www.ft.com/content/78d78b7c-fbfc-11e9-a354-36acbbb0d9b6; VIKTOR MAYER-
SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW 
WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK (2013). 
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either predictable or positive.86 Warnings have been expressed within na-
tional and international forums about the dangers for human rights when data 
and predictive modelling take precedence over human judgment.87 It is ar-
gued that the logic prioritized by predictive analysis is inevitably biased be-
cause the datasets to which algorithms are applied are biased. Even datasets 
with billions of pieces of information do not capture the fullness of people’s 
lives or the diversity of their experiences.88 In addition, big data is changing 
human behavior in society in ways not yet fully understood.89 This paper 
argues that each of these dangers applies equally to scholars working with 
social capital theory, particularly if big data is being used to analyze and 
improve the value of organizational social capital, or to alter organization 
behavior linked to its social capital. 
Social capital scholars have explored the potential uses and benefits of 
AI. Studies of social capital are increasingly using AI, data analytics, and 
data mining as tools for measuring and analyzing social capital and its con-
sequences.90 In a related area, the Deloitte Social Impact Measurement 
Model provides a machine-learning model programmed to estimate the so-
cial impact of corporate investments at the local level in the United States.91 
As further discussed below, China is perhaps the country most advanced in 
the use of society-wide data analytics for a range of purposes, including the 
establishment of a nationwide SCS. 
 
 86. Philip Alston, Report of The Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human 
Rights, U.N. Doc. A/74/48037 (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Is-
sues/Poverty/A_74_48037_AdvanceUneditedVersion.docx; MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & 
CUKIER, supra note 85. 
 87. E.g., Alston, supra note 86; MACHINES CAN LEARN, BUT WHAT WILL WE TEACH 
THEM?: ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AROUND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MACHINE 
LEARNING (Chartered Acct. Austl. & N.Z., 2018), https://www.charteredaccount-
antsanz.com/-/media/746d9bb465154cbb891f147eacde869d.ashx; Lee Rainie & Janna An-
derson, Code-Dependent: Pros and Cons of the Algorithm Age, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Feb. 
8, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2017/02/08/code-dependent-pros-and-cons-
of-the-algorithm-age/. 
 88. Rainie & Anderson, supra note 87. 
 89. ZUBOFF, supra note 43. 
 90. Nathan Eagle, et al., Network Diversity and Economic Development, 328 SCI. 1029 
(2010), https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1186605; Nahed Azab & Mohamed Elsherif, A 
Framework For Using Data Analytics To Measure Trust In Government Through Social Cap-
ital Generated Over Governmental Social Media Platforms, PROC. 19TH ANN. INT’L CONF. ON 
DIGIT. GOV’T RES.: GOVERNANCE DATA AGE, Art. 11 (May 2018), 
https://doi.org/10.1145/3209281.3209331; Jar-Der Luo et al., Big Data Research Guided by 
Sociological Theory: A Triadic Dialogue Among Big Data Analysis, Theory, and Predictive 
Models, 6 J. OF CHINESE SOCIO. Art. 11 (2019) (China). 
 91. Steven Ellis et al., Social Capital: Measuring the Community Impact of Corporate 
Spending, 24 DELOITTE REV. (2019), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/insights/us/ar-
ticles/4945_Social-capital-corporate-spending/DI_DR24_Social-Capital.pdf. 
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The use of AI to measure social capital is typically justified by the de-
sire to improve the volume, depth, range, and accuracy of the data informing 
an organization’s understanding of its embeddedness in local communities 
where the organization operates and the value of its related networks. Big 
data may also satisfy the desire to better understand the changing dynamics 
of relationships between community, business, and government, thereby 
supporting more informed decision-making.92  
As the strategic challenges faced by organizations—and the collabora-
tive strategies designed to address them—become more complex, increas-
ingly sophisticated mechanisms for data collection and analysis are being 
developed. Modern AI technologies are welcomed by many in the business 
community as the solution, not least because AI can also provide new tools 
for measuring and evaluating the success of strategies aimed at enhancing 
firm-specific value. This paper argues, however, that at the same time as 
welcoming the benefits offered by AI in measuring, valuing, and enhancing 
social capital, business and policymakers need to be equally aware of its in-
herent dangers. In particular, the collection of ever-increasing amounts of 
data generated by individuals whose  interactions in the real world poses a 
number of major challenges to both trust and reciprocity—both integral to 
the formation and maintenance of social capital.  
The desire to “measure” a firm’s social capital impact, and its depend-
ence upon social networks, incentivizes firms to collect as much data as pos-
sible to use in that measuring. Such data collection, whatever efforts might 
be made to anonymize or de-identify it, clearly increases the risks and po-
tential for privacy breaches. While a distinction is often made between 
“meta-data” on the one hand, and personal information on the other,93 it is a 
distinction that is often far from clear. Likewise, ownership and other rights 
connected to “incidental” personal information swept up into a data collec-
tion system are  rarely well defined.94 Regulatory strategies aimed at address-
ing the impacts of AI on individual privacy are being developed and imple-
mented but remain piecemeal at national or regional level rather than global; 
and are often inadequate in keeping up with the pace of technological 
change.95The mere act of data collection also directly impacts society, as-
suming that society is aware that the process is taking place. As Jeremy 
 
 92. Eagle et. al, supra note 90; Azab & Elsherif, supra note 90; Luo et al., supra note 90. 
 93. Trenton Schreurs & Katrina Mawer, Metadata and Privacy: Is Your Information Pro-
tected?, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/de-
tail.aspx?g=d4c3ebfd-39ff-4165-b6e4-cfcdf588fdd0; Sean MacNiven, Metadata: Curse or 
Cure for GDPR Compliance?, COMMC’N DIR. (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.communication-
director.com/issues/privacy-protection-and-public-debate-gdpr-and-communications/meta-
data-curse-or-cure-gdpr/#.YF5VZWRKhhA. 
 94. LYNCH, supra note 85 at 95. 
 95. Schreurs & Mawer, supra note 93; MacNiven, supra note 93.  
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Bentham knew when he designed his panopticon, observation affects behav-
ior.96 This may be good, such as when the awareness of a hidden security 
camera deters illegal behavior. But it may also have a negative impact by 
detracting from individual autonomy when individuals censor their own be-
havior.  
Modern organizations are utilizing digital data not just in the design of 
business strategies, but within the organization to aid the management of hu-
man resource strategies. Here again, the drive to institute metrics may arise 
from the best of intentions and may initially appear successful. The desire to 
simplify problems to be solved, or goals to be reached, may lead to a focus 
on the most easily measurable metrics. But measuring the simple can also 
become a source of metric dysfunction when the desired outcome is com-
plex.97 Most jobs have multiple responsibilities, and most organizations have 
multiple goals. Giving undue metric weight to one responsibility or goal can 
lead to deceptive results. It can also mean that inputs are given priority over 
outcomes. The seductive nature of quantification—the production of num-
bers and graphs that allow for easy comparisons among people and institu-
tions—can further disguise the distortion of context, history, and meaning 
that is taking place.98  
A further challenge digitization presents for the social capital theory 
arises from the fact that data itself has value and can be sold. The larger and 
more granular the dataset, the greater its value to potential buyers. Digital 
technology services are used by their corporate owner or creators to harvest 
“behavioral surplus,” that can then be sold for profit.99 Facebook and Ama-
zon are amongst the most famous examples, collecting large amounts of data 
about social networks, which they then analyze and package according to the 
needs of the businesses purchasing the data analytics. The value to the buyer 
of the data lies in the desire to capitalize upon the most profitable reaches of 
expanded social networks.100 However, once individuals in society are 
treated as potentially profitable units of information, they may no longer be 
seen as human. The human element that is at the heart of what it means to be 
a social being can thus be lost. The loss of social autonomy stemming from 
data-driven automated decision making can be illustrated by the example of 
automated on-line rating surveys. In online rating surveys, the decision to 
select a particular level of customer satisfaction may be made freely, but 
 
 96. Jacques-Alain Miller, Le Despotisme de l’Utile: la Machine Panoptique de Jeremy 
Bentham, 3 ORNICAR? BULLETIN PERIODIQUE DU CHAMP FREUDIEN 3 (1975) (Fr.). 
 97. Kirsten Martin, Ethical Implications and Accountability of Algorithms, 160 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 835 (2019). 
  98. Martin, supra note 97; JERRY Z. MULLER, THE TYRANNY OF METRICS (2018). 
 99. ZUBOFF, supra note 43. 
 100. ZUBOFF supra note 43, at 278-82.  
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decision itself not fully autonomous.101 While survey ratings may capture the 
extent of a brand’s reputation, they can rarely capture the resilience of that 
reputation—how easily it might be fractured or destroyed. The information 
produced by digital analytics may not lead to a genuine understanding of the 
nature of the organization’s impacts or dependencies.102  
Another significant challenge digital technology presents for social cap-
ital theory stems from its use by businesses to move from “recognizing” the 
value of social trust and networks to the deliberate “creation” of new forms 
of profit-generating social capital. One of the processes through which this 
transformation occurs is known as gamification—a process whereby com-
mercial intent is disguised as a game. The process of gamification is ex-
plained by Zuboff using the product developed by Niantic Labs known as 
Pokémon Go. The commercial intent behind Pokémon Go is the desire to 
actuate human behavior quickly and at scale, while driving it toward guar-
anteed outcomes. Pokémon Go allowed its makers to closely track the move-
ments of game-playing participants while also facilitated the shaping of be-
havior.103 The game’s true value to the wider business community became 
obvious as local business owners began to use elements of the “game,” in-
cluding sponsorships and “Lure Modules,” to attract increased foot traffic. 
The success of Pokémon Go for its producers lay in the increased sales vol-
ume and customer base it could provide for local businesses paying to asso-
ciate themselves with the game.104  
Behavior is equally being shaped in China. The only substantial differ-
ence between China and Western markets is that in Western markets the pro-
cess is controlled by private corporations, while in China the process is con-
trolled by a socialist, one-party state. In both contexts, digital data is used as 
a tool to both measure and increase the social value of business relations. 
The challenge for theory is to understand how technology facilitates and in-
fluences relationships of governance. Governance is an important source of 
social capital since it provides a framework for establishing society-wide 
shared understandings and social norms. At the societal level, strong coordi-
nating institutions are important. They act like a glue that keeps modern so-
ciety together by producing universally understood rules.105 They provide a 
degree of confidence in how others will act, especially when institutions can 
 
  101. LYNCH, supra note 85, at 102.  
 102. Chartered Acct. Austl. & N.Z, supra note 87. 
 103. ZUBOFF, supra note 43, at 309-19. 
  104. ZUBOFF, supra note 43, at 309-19. 
 105. Alejandro Portes & Erik Vickstrom, Diversity, Social Capital, and Cohesion, 37(1) 
ANN. REV. SOCIO. 461 (2011). 
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“compel,” directly or indirectly, the observance of these rules.106 Throughout 
much of the world it is non-state action, such as NGO action, accreditation 
and auditing, and media reporting that helps generate an environment where 
information is trusted, translated into assessments of, and consequences (re-
wards or punishments) for, organizations. In China, state involvement drives 
these processes, making them far more extensive in coverage. The success 
of such a system in generating trust depends on the dominant attitude and 
beliefs of people and organizations towards the system.107 
The AI-driven nature of China’s SCS has been examined by writers 
highlighting the “Big Brother” aspects of the SCS,108 including its applica-
tion to corporations.109 A relational governance perspective on China’s cor-
porate SCS highlights tensions between China’s use of big data to assess the 
“social credit” of organizations and attempts by analysts and organizations 
to utilize the tools of big data in their assessments of corporate social capital 
and fulfilment of CSR criteria more generally. It is necessary to understand 
the full extent of these tensions given the sheer size and ambition of China’s 
expansionary policy initiatives, including the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 
which would effectively extends China’s SCS beyond China’s territorial bor-
ders into societies with very different perceptions of social relations and the 
behaviors that give them value.  
 
V. The Politicization of Trust: China’s Social Credit System 
 
China’s SCS is best described as a broad policy project aimed at en-
couraging individuals, businesses, legal institutions, and the government it-
self to be more trustworthy (守信, shouxin) through a mix of measures. The 
State Council’s 2014 “Notice Concerning the Issuance of the Planning Out-
line for the Establishment of a Social Credit System 2014-2020” sets out an 
ambitious program for strengthening integrity in: government affairs, com-
mercial transactions, society , and judicial credibility.110 
 
 106. Tristan Claridge, China’s Social Credit System: An Ambitious Attempt to Build Social 
Capital, SOC. CAP. RSCH. & TRAINING (Feb. 3, 2020) (N.Z.), https://www.socialcapitalre-
search.com/chinas-social-credit-system-social-capital/. 
 107. Batia Ben Hador, Three Levels of Organizational Social Capital and Their Connec-
tion to Performance, 36 J. MGMT. DEV. 348 (2017). 
 108. Min Jiang & King-Wa Fu, supra note 1; Grote & Bonomi, supra note 9; Yu-Jie Chen 
et al., “Rule of Trust”: The Power and Perils of China’s Social Credit Megaproject, 32 
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (2019). 
 109. The Digital Hand: How China’s Corporate Social Credit System Conditions Market 
Actors, SINOLYTICS & E.U. CHAMBER COM. CHINA (Aug. 28, 2019), http://www.euro-
peanchamber.com.cn/en/publications-corporate-social-credit-system. 
 110. Shehui Xinyong Tixi Jianshe Guihua Gangyao, supra note 65. 
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The phrase social credit (社会信用, shehui xinyong) has been de-
scribed as a “working term” an umbrella category encompassing several 
moving parts of a broader policy agenda that includes both national initia-
tives as well as city-level pilot projects that do not generalize to a country-
wide scale.111 Often the term has been mischaracterized in the Western press 
due to the emergence of private credit-rating apps by Alibaba (Sesame 
Credit) and other Chinese firms used by individuals seeking a personal credit 
rating.  
 From a hermeneutic viewpoint, the meanings conveyed by the terms 
social credit in English and shehui xinyong in Chinese respectively, may be 
different. The Chinese phrase does not necessarily imply interpersonal rela-
tions as in the English word social but could easily refer to “the public” or 
“society.” For example, the Chinese term shehui ziben (社会资本,literally 
social capital), refers to financial capital invested by members of the general 
public. Social capital does not share the English meaning (discussed above) 
of “networks of relationships among people in society creating economic 
value by facilitating the effective functioning of that society.” Similarly, xin-
yongor credit, can mean believable as in jiang xinyong  (讲信用), which lit-
erally translates as talks credit, but means “one's speech can be trusted.” 
The SCS applies to legal persons (corporations) and other organiza-
tions, including NGOs, just as much as it applies to individuals. Every Chi-
nese corporation has a Uniform Social Credit Code, which is a composite 
18-digit identification code to which all government data and supplementary 
information is attached. It is the data attached to the Code that is used to 
determine social credit ratings. For corporations, the ratings system follows 
three steps: (i) government definition of rating requirements; (ii) monitoring 
of companies’ behavior; and (iii) algorithm-based ratings of companies and 
direct consequences.112  
 
A. Government Definition of Rating Requirements 
 
Government definitions of rating requirements are found in the over 
350 regulations, laws, and policies published by China’s central government 
 
 111. Elizabeth M. Lynch, What’s the T on China’s Social Credit System? - Jeremy Daum 
Explains - Part 1 of 2, CHINA L. & POL’Y (Nov. 12, 2018), https://chinalawand-
policy.com/2018/11/12/whats-the-t-on-chinas-social-credit-system-jeremy-daum-explains-
part-1-of-2/; Elizabeth M. Lynch, What’s the T on China’s Social Credit System? - Jeremy 
Daum Continues - Part 1 of 2, CHINA L. & POL’Y (Nov. 13, 2018), https://chinalawand-
policy.com/2018/11/13/whats-the-t-on-chinas-social-credit-system-jeremy-daum-continues-
part-2-of-2/. 
 112. SINOLYTICS & E.U. CHAMBER COM. CHINA, supra note 109. 
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authorities between 2013 and 2019. Dispersed across this still-growing body 
of regulatory documents are the topic-specific scale ratings (usually around 
30 for a company) and specific requirements (approximately 300 for an 
MNC) applicable to the business activities of any firm subject to the relevant 
legal regime.113 For the most part, regulatory requirements are clearly de-
fined. Lack of transparency arises primarily from the dispersion of the infor-
mation across a multitude of government documents.114 Government regula-
tions published since 2013 mostly include provisions stating that non-
compliance is will be recorded in the SCS database. Through this simple 
method, a growing body of business regulations covering aspects of market 
behavior—for example, the Anti-Unfair Competition Law 2019,115— are 
systematically linked into the SCS.116 
In addition to specific legal requirements, the SCS uses topic-specific 
scale ratings linked to regulatory benchmarks. The use of scale ratings 
changes the regulatory landscape from the traditional clear binary division 
between legal and illegal, to a continuous scale from bad to good, with 
shades of grey in between. Even here, the SCS is not imposing new legal 
obligations, but focusses upon collecting data about compliance with exist-
ing obligations.117 While legal obligations are not, for the most part, ex-
tended; the consequences of breaching such obligations are extended. Thus, 
non-compliant behavior by one business can affect its business partners, sup-
pliers, and customers. This has the effect of burdening companies “with the 
responsibility of continuously monitoring their partners’ trustworthiness 
across the entirety of their business network.”118 Non-complaint behavior by 
a corporate or other legal person also extends to, and affects, the rating of 
individual legal representatives of that organization. The monitoring system 
thus becomes a systemic, self-reinforcing tool through which behavioral 




 113. SINOLYTICS & E.U. CHAMBER COM. CHINA, supra note 109. 
 114. Shazeda Ahmed, The Messy Truth About Social Credit, CHINA FILE (Apr. 22, 2019), 
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SINOLYTICS & E.U. CHAMBER COM. CHINA, supra note 109, at 11. 
 115. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Buzhengdang Jingzheng Fa (中华人民共和
国共和国反不正当竞争法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China Against Unfair Compe-
tition] (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Gaz., Sept. 2, 1993, effective 
Dec. 1, 1993, amended in 2017 and 2019) 339 Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Gaz. 
606 (China). 
  116. SINOLYTICS & E.U. CHAMBER COM. CHINA, supra note 109, at 13. 
 117. Lynch, supra note 111. 
  118. SINOLYTICS & E.U. CHAMBER COM. CHINA, supra note 109, at 13. 
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B. Monitoring of Companies’ Behavior 
 
The second step of corporate SCS is the monitoring of companies’ be-
havior using a full spectrum of advanced technology. Companies within Chi-
nese jurisdiction must transfer ever increasing amounts of required data di-
rectly to the central database of the SCS and to different government 
agencies through several reporting processes. Data so transferred becomes 
part of the SCS, even if the transfer itself was not directed towards that end; 
for example,  transfers made in the course of regular bureaucratic procedures 
like license renewals or product certifications. . Feedback loops are being 
generated between the regulator and regulated so that each shapes the other. 
In this way, the system becomes stronger than its “hard-law” aspects alone. 
It becomes reinforced by “soft-law” tools of governance—socialization 
within regulatory networks, and structuring incentives for uncoordinated pri-
vate actors.  
The SCS is, in theory at least, designed to facilitate improved coordina-
tion between government inspection agencies responsible for different as-
pects of business compliance (e.g., environment, labor, etc.). Government 
inspections are being brought under coordinated management in accordance 
with the principle “two random selections, one open” (双随机、一公开).119 
Both the inspection target and the responsible inspecting official will be ran-
domly selected and matched, theoretically limiting possibilities for preferen-
tial treatment. As a basis for the inspectors’ selection, government authorities 
are currently creating “monitoring item catalogues” in which they divide 
tasks and precisely define which authority and department is responsible for 
which monitoring task. This is meant to avoid unnecessary duplication of 
work and facilitate the systematic assessment of government entities and 
their officials.120 It also ensures that officials from diverse institutional envi-
ronments are socialized according to a standardized system of normative pol-
icies and priorities.  
 
C. Algorithm-Based Ratings of Companies and Direct Conse-
quences 
 
Organizations with good social credit histories will find the burden of 
supervisory interventions and compliance reduced, while those with a poorer 
inspection record over time will find the opposite. For example, companies 
named on a blacklist for non-compliance with environmental regulations will 
find that they become subject to “strengthened” supervision and 
 
 119. SINOLYTICS & E.U. CHAMBER COM. CHINA, supra note 109, at 14.  
 120. SINOLYTICS & E.U. CHAMBER COM. CHINA, supra note 109. 
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management by government departments at all levels.121 Remote and real-
time monitoring of market-related metrics such as product performance, 
emissions, and logistics, including by third-party private companies like 
Alibaba and Tencent, provide an important complement to government au-
thorized monitoring efforts. The SCS is thus shaping government and gov-
ernance practices as much as it is shaping the behavior of regulated entities. 
In this manner, socialization via “soft-law” governance tools exceeds “hard-
law” regulations in reach and influence.  
Thus, non-compliant behavior by a company in one area of CSR, like 
tax compliance, will affect the company’s rating in other fields, such as cus-
toms clearance or environmental agency inspections. This is the deliberate 
result of a series of Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) between large 
groups of government authorities. Some of these MoUs define rewards for 
good rating results, but for the time being, the reward mechanisms are less 
developed than the joint sanctions which are applied to negative ratings. 
Most MoUs are signed by 20 to 30 government ministries and bureaus and 
are aimed at mutual recognition of each other’s judgements on a company. 
Mutual recognition then forms the basis for applying corresponding (joint) 
sanction(s) on the company concerned. Thus, a rating as a distrusted corpo-
rate taxpayer not only leads to tax specific sanctions (e.g., fines) but can also 
impacts a company’s license approvals, land usage rights, and the travel op-
tions of its legal representatives, amongst other things.122 Blacklisting, rat-
ings, and rankings thus become additional “soft-law”governance tools with 
effects extending well beyond the individual enterprises.  
The AI-driven nature of “CSR as government” in China is clearly 
changing the shape of governance as much it is shaping behaviors of the 
governed. The challenge for the SCS as a system arises from the fact that 
different government agencies and governance actors are motivated by in-
terests that do not always coincide. The Ministry of Ecology and the Envi-
ronment is not motivated by the same concerns as the Ministry of Science 
and Technology. The interests of the State Administration for Market Regu-
lation are not necessarily shared by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Affairs. These potential conflicts exist not only in areas of policy and policy 
implementation, but also throughout more prosaic areas of government fund-
ing priorities, personnel allocations, and jurisdictional overlaps. The con-
flicts also exist at all levels of governance, from national to local, both 
 
 121. Guanyu Fabu Hunansheng Huanjingbaohu Heimingdan (Diyipi) de Tongzhi (关于
发布湖南省环境保护黑名单（第一批）的通知) [Notice on the issuance of the blacklist of 
environmental protection in Hunan Province (first batch)] (promulgated by the Ecology and 
Environment Department of Hunan Province, Apr. 18, 2018), http://sthjt.hu-
nan.gov.cn/sthjt/xxgk/zdly/wrfz/qyhjxypj/201805/t20180514_5011811.html (China). 
 122. SINOLYTICS & E.U. CHAMBER COM. CHINA, supra note 109, at 15.  
Upload 3-A Relational Governance Perspective 4/15/2021  3:58 PM 
2021] A Relational Governance Perspective 135 
between levels of the same ministerial portfolio, and between governance 
agencies at the same level of government. While the systemic consequences 
arising from such conflicts remain to be seen, it is possible to envision pos-
sible scenarios.  
The relative size and influence of most businesses compared to individ-
ual subjects of the SCS provides a starting point. Businesses, particularly 
SOEs, may seek to use relationships with relevant government agencies and 
individual decision-makers within those agencies to their own advantage. 
This is not an original point to make—there exists entire literature on regu-
latory capture and how businesses use influence to shape regulatory decision 
outcomes.123 What is new in the Chinese context is the potential for business 
leverage to impact the operation of the joint sanctions system under the SCS. 
Under the principle of joint sanctions, all government authorities who are 
party to the same MoU agree to levy sanctions not only based on the ratings 
they are directly responsible for, but also on ratings by other relevant agen-
cies. It is this imposition of consequences that distinguishes the SCS from 
rating mechanisms found elsewhere. The sanctions, and less often the re-
wards, agreed upon by government authorities who are party to a joint MoU 
have a legal basis for their implementation under Chinese law. There is noth-
ing voluntary about them from the viewpoint of those being rated. Yet once 
the data processing infrastructure is completed, the system will rely on the 
transfer of accurate data between government agencies. Within such a large 
and complex system, there is much that can go wrong: both systemically and 
in relation to data linked to individual entities.  
Systemically, the data-driven nature of China’s corporate SCS limits, 
or even excludes, the ability of individual firms to develop and follow a 
unique CSR strategy besides the state-determined criteria. Within a Party-
state defined system of good corporate conduct, there are limited possibilities 
for individual firms to frame, scope, and apply a nuanced strategy for en-
hancing the positive social impacts of its operations. Likewise, firms have 
no incentive to develop unconventional approaches towards, for example, 
strengthening the resilience of social relationships. Rather, the rational, risk-
minimizing strategy for China-based firms of all types will be to adopt a 
precautionary approach by conforming as much as possible to state plan 
models and directives. Such an environment has obvious detrimental impli-
cations for innovation, adaptive capacity,124 experimentation, and individual 
entrepreneurship. The information asymmetry created by algorithmic credit 
scoring has two further profound effects.  
 
 123. See generally Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. 
ECON. POL’Y 203 (2006) (U.K.). 
 124. See Mark Pelling & Chris High, Understanding Adaptation: What Can Social Capital 
Offer Assessments of Adaptive Capacity?, 15 GLOB. ENV’T CHANGE 308 (2005) (Neth.). 
Upload 3-A Relational Governance Perspective 4/15/2021  3:58 PM 
136 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 44:2 
First, it threatens to entrench systemic biases within firms’ recruiting 
strategies and practices. Recruitment practices may become modified to fa-
vor individuals with consistently high social credit scores, including net-
works counted valuable by the system both within and external to the recruit-
ing firm. This is likely to have a negative influence on the diversity of all 
types—human capital, social capital, and demographics—with conse-
quences for team effectiveness at all levels from the boardroom down.125 For 
example, in the area of gender diversity, the impact of Chinese policies since 
2012 is now obvious. China’s ranking in the Global Gender Gap Economic 
Participation and Opportunity subindex has fallen steadily from 46 in 2010 
to 91 in 2019. In the women’s Global Gender Gap Political Empowerment 
subindex, it has fallen from 56th to 95th position over the same period.126 
Cultural diversity is even more noticeable for its absence, with leadership 
positions throughout Chinese politics, business, and society occupied almost 
uniformly by, mostly male, Han Chinese.127  
Second, the information asymmetry generated by China’s SCS com-
pounds power imbalances within the existing system. This in turn makes it 
more likely that firms will engage in defensive strategies aimed at political 
merit-making, even if only to mitigate the intrusiveness of government in-
spection, auditing, and registration processes. It may, for example, become 
an accepted norm for organizations to cultivate political favor with state of-
ficials.128 This has been labelled “the gamification of trust,”129 and may be-
come, in practice, the politicization of trust, as businesses identify an ad-
vantage in developing closer relationships with powerful officials.  
Metric fixation invites gaming and leads to dysfunction, particularly 
when the stakes are high. This was demonstrated in 1975 by two social sci-
entists working independently on opposite sides of the Atlantic. “What has 
come to be called ‘Campbell’s Law,’ named after the American social psy-
chologist Donald T. Campbell, holds that ‘[t]he more any quantitative social 
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indicator is used for social decision-making, the more subject it will be to 
corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the 
social processes it is intended to monitor.’ In a variation name for the  British 
economist who formulated it, we have Goodhart’s Law, which states, ‘[a]ny 
measure used for control is unreliable.’”130 
China’s SCS’s poses a danger to good corporate governance standards 
because it replaces existing formal institutions of state, law, and market with 
a dangerous combination of boundless and uncertain indicators of trustwor-
thiness, and the unrestrained use of technology.131 The danger is that when 
formal institutions of the state, law, and market no-longer work, organiza-
tions relying on these institutions become socially and economically ex-
cluded. Meanwhile, those able to draw upon connections and informal tac-
tics, such as bribes, to “bend” or “break” the formal rules will succeed.132 A 
“shadow” network of social capital relationships may develop—much like 
China’s $10 trillion shadow banking ecosystem that has evolved to create 
debtor-creditor relationships outside of the regulated lending sector.133 
For organizations willing and able to harvest social credit for commer-
cial success, the logical conclusion of China’s SCS is that the firm itself be-
comes subordinated to the Party’s larger project ends. At the opposite ex-
treme of Western neo-liberalism’s “there is no such thing as society,” 
China’s SCS offers a world where there is only society, and only one vision 
of what that society should look like. Individual autonomy becomes subor-
dinated to the collective good. Businesses in such a Party controlled system 
become implicated in society’s workings —for good and for bad. Commerce 
can be used to promote environmentally sustainable consumerism, or it can 
be used to promote nationalistic fervor directed against foreign countries that 
have displeased Beijing. For example, commercial search engines and social 
media can be used by various stakeholders in China, including SOEs, to 
shape nationalism for their own ends.134 The logical conclusion of China’s 
SCS thus becomes a digitally driven, harmoniously networked society oper-
ating smoothly to the evolving tune of Party-driven policy directions.  
The establishment of data-collecting supervisory instruments and gov-
ernance networks in China is not necessarily different in scale or kind to the 
instruments of data-driven governance already established in Western 
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regulatory systems. The difference lies in the political, social, and economic 
assumptions upon which the Chinese system is based. The normative bases 
for constructing and operating China’s SCS are not those of Western com-
panies or the states from which they operate.135 In many respects, they are 
incompatible with the political and economic ideals at the heart of the West-
ern political and economic organization. For foreign companies linked into 
China’s SCS, there is also the risk that data harvesting may be redolent with 
ulterior purposes: commercial, political, or economic. In the absence of ro-
bust social credit-based mechanisms of accountability for government, es-
pecially at the lower levels, it is not clear that the integrity principles at the 
heart of the SCS, in theory, will be embedded in the practice of lower-level 
authority (public and private) charged with its implementation. If the SCS 
has little effect on attitudes and values, cognitive and relational social capital, 
it may simply result in organizational structures designed to “play the rules 
of the game” without a cultural change.  
An understanding of the social implications of China’s corporate SCS 
is particularly important for the many organizations worldwide potentially, 
or already in relationships, with Chinese business partners or who are in-
volved in the extensive network of China-sponsored projects along that na-
tion’s extensive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In light of the sheer reach 
and scale of the BRI, and the enormous potential for tensions to arise be-
tween different social priorities and values in relation to assessing BRI pro-
jects, this article concludes with a brief consideration of the implications of 
the SCS for non-Chinese entities that become BRI stakeholders.  
 
VI. The Social Credit System and China’s BRI 
 
Theorizing a CSR perspective on China’s corporate SCS is important 
because of the potential reach of that system beyond China’s border through 
its BRI.136 The BRI is by now well known as the nation’s long-term national 
project which aims to establish connective infrastructure facilities in and 
throughout Central Asia, the Middle East, parts of Europe, and beyond.137 
National infrastructure projects, including transport and communications in-
frastructure using AI technologies, are in much demand in many countries 
 
 135. Backer, supra note 80; Zou, supra note 76. 
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along the BRI route.138 By 2019, over 68 countries had signed on to BRI 
projects.139 Along with the physical infrastructure of the BRI, China is also 
exporting its policy and regulatory ‘infrastructure. Under China’s version of 
State capitalism, the party-state exerts influence on the activities and operat-
ing environments of Chinese firms abroad, particularly in sectors where 
many firms are state-owned, state-invested, or state-connected.140 Along the 
BRI, as within China, state and market players have formed often beneficial 
symbiotic relationships to maximize political and economic gains.141 The 
state plays an active role in organization capital and labor flows abroad to 
states that host Chinese investments, which may involve leveraging geopo-
litical and diplomatic relationships and economic and financial support to 
host states. It also means that the Chinese vision of party-led corporate good 
behavior is part of this expansion abroad; along with the SCS infrastructure 
aimed at supporting this vision.  
The Chinese government has sought to sell the BRI as a kind of “global 
public good,” able to connect economies, people, and cultures from Africa 
through Asia to Europe.142 According to the Chinese government, China is 
committed to ensuring that the BRI contributes to achieving the Sustainable 
Development Goals and the Paris Agreement goals by promoting “green in-
frastructure construction, green investment, green finance, and [protection 
of] the common home for the sake of human survival.”143 China’s Ministry 
of Ecology and Environment is one of over 100 Chinese and international 
partner institutions forming the BRI International Green Development Coa-
lition (BRIGDC). Non-Chinese partners include the International Institute 
for Sustainable Development, the environment ministries of 25 countries 
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  142. See generally Jingxia Shi, The Belt and Road Initiative and International Law: An 
International Public Goods Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND THE RULE OF 
LAW IN CHINA UNDER THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 9 (Yun Zhao ed., 2018) (U.K.). 
 143. International Institute for Sustainable Development, Coalition Aims to Build Sustain-
ability into Belt and Road Initiative Projects, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Apr. 25, 
2019), https://www.iisd.org/articles/coalition-aims-build-sustainability-belt-and-road-initia-
tive-projects?q=media/coalition-aims-build-sustainability-belt-and-road-initiative-projects, 
(citing Xi Jinping, BRI Forum, April 2019). 
Upload 3-A Relational Governance Perspective 4/15/2021  3:58 PM 
140 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 44:2 
hosting or potentially hosting BRI projects, and over 60 NGOs and research 
institutes.144 
Assuming that algorithms can be and will be used to measure actual and 
potential environmental and social impacts of BRI projects, the question then 
arises: whose algorithms will be used? If the algorithms driving China’s cor-
porate SCS are used, as they likely will be, to assess BRI projects, what 
might be the longer-term impact on both the project and the assessment? To 
what extent will alternative assessments, potentially based on guidelines for 
social capital analysis developed by BRI-project co-funding institutions such 
as the ADB or World Bank, confirm or contradict China-driven analysis? 
China’s BRI vision is inextricably intertwined with its SCS vision. Both are 
imbued with a discourse of technological nationalism, and to varying ex-
tents, directed by “national champions.”145 It is precisely the technocratic, 
decontextualized, and nonreflexive nature of China’s corporate SCS which 
renders it particularly insensitive to local social, political, and cultural prior-
ities and sensitivities outside of mainland China—including in BRI partner 
nations.146  
Yet the advanced nature of the communications technology and data 
analytics of China’s SCS indicates t it may well be winning the AI race. Par-
ticularly for projects based in developing state BRI partners, China’s supe-
rior analytics may overwhelm alternative mechanisms and avenues for col-
lecting data about the sustainability performance of BRI projects. The danger 
is that digitized SCS algorithms may not be culturally sensitive to the impacts 
of BRI projects outside of China. BRI projects driven by SCS algorithms are 
more likely to be designed according to a Chinese policy-driven template, 
and less likely to be amenable to adaption in line with the social, political, 
and economic realities of the localities where those projects are situated. BRI 
project managers driven by SCS metrics may be unwilling or unable to tap 
into, or draw upon, community-based knowledge, networks, and relation-
ships essential to local support and project success.147  
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The history of BRI projects so far does not bode well for the ability of 
China’s SCS to maximize the benefits and minimize the harms of BRI pro-
jects. To date China’s BRI projects  have more often than not been oriented 
towards China’s own strategic, political, and economic aims, and have 
proven remarkably insensitive to social or environmental impacts. For ex-
ample, the “ridiculous rise and collapse” of Boten,148 a border town between 
China and Laos, stands as just one reminder of what can happen when the 
potential for negative impacts is ignored. Originally meant to be a Golden 
City-special economic zone serving as China’s gateway into Southeast Asia, 
Boten is now a ghost town of concrete rubble.  
China’s leadership continues to proclaim the development benefits of 
the BRI by linking it directly to the United Nations Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDG). The challenge for researchers will be to objectively assess the 
impacts of BRI projects in terms of the SDGs. Such assessments will need 
to draw upon the most rigorously tested tools for measuring social and envi-
ronmental impacts, tailored to the specific circumstances and context of each 
project. Tools for measuring environmental impacts are already well devel-
oped and becoming more sophisticated with the use of AI. Measuring tools 
developed by social capital investigators may prove useful for measuring so-
cial impacts. These include questionnaires, surveys, interviews, and mapping 
exercises used to collect data about social capital at an individual meso and 
macro level; all of which can now be entered into virtual repositories and 
subjected to analysis using the latest AI tools.149  
BRI projects pose particular challenges for those using such tools. First, 
there is the challenge of understanding and measuring the social effects of a 
BRI project over both the short and long-term. These may include the for-
mation of new social relations in the digital realm, which then have real-
world impacts. Some social relationships, including social groupings, may 
be made viable only after those involved are digitally connected, which in 
turn may be part of a BRI project. Such connections may have positive im-
pacts on the lives of those involved, or, as is becoming increasingly obvious, 
digital connections can have harmful effects as well. Unlike face-to-face in-
teractions and personal relationships, digital social relations are easily sur-
veyed, monitored, influenced, and controlled by institutions, including busi-
ness and state institutions. A related challenge arises from the risk that 
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private companies, public (government) bodies, and international organiza-
tions may seek to exploit both the data and the tools for analyzing the social 
impacts of a BRI project. If individuals and companies involved in BRI pro-
jects are subject to data collection and analysis by both Chinese and non-
Chinese entities, it may ultimately come down to a question of which AI 




This paper contributes to theoretical and real-world understandings of 
how big data shapes corporate behavior and CSR policy, both within and 
beyond national borders. China’s SCS stands in sharp contrast to other at-
tempts to utilize big data to track, evaluate, and regulate corporate behavior. 
Private-sector attempts to track financial flows, or the social or environmen-
tal impacts of business activity — cannot compete with China’s SCS. No 
alternative or existing system for evaluating the socially (ir)responsible be-
havior of business entities equals the comprehensiveness or scale of China’s 
SCS.  
To understand the implications of Chinese SCS on corporations and so-
ciety at large, this paper adopting a comparative law perspective. A modified 
relational governance framework provides a useful theoretical tool for un-
derstanding how corporate behavior is being shaped by China’s SCS. The 
relational governance model acknowledges the presence of politics in deci-
sion-making processes and recognizes that the boundaries between state, 
business, and civil society are far from clear, and in some state contexts the 
three may be closely entwined. This is very much the case in China, making 
the model eminently suited for adaptation to the Chinese context. The paper 
also draws attention to similarities of discourse surrounding China’s SCS, 
and discussions of social capital as a source of value in Western scholarship. 
In particular, China’s SCS and Western social capital protocols both attribute 
value to social relations that are strong and stable, and both use the language 
of trustworthiness in doing so.  
Despite surface similarities, Chinese and Western understandings of 
CSR are unlikely to converge in meaningful ways so long as their legal, po-
litical, and discursive interpretations remain informed by distinct local forms 
of social relations. Yet the social vision supported by China’s corporate SCS 
may well be sustained, even outside of China by a more effective set of com-
pliance pressures than those imposed by Western stakeholder groups. Mini-
mizing the risk of sanctions under China’s SCS may, for example, take prec-
edence over engaging with local communities and other stakeholder groups 
for corporations involved in BRI projects. These pressures give China’s SCS 
a level of resilience that extend well beyond China’s borders and may 
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compete with alternative visions of social worth. At the same time however, 
the potential internal contradictions within the SCS give rise to inherent 
weaknesses.  
First, the political nature of the policy settings driving the SCS may be 
exploited by private actors seeking to “gamify” different parts of the rating 
system to gain an advantage. Second, conflicts of policy and political interest 
between different government agencies, and possibly also between different 
levels of the same agency, may impede or corrupt the smooth exchange of 
information and coordination upon which the SCS depends upon for its ef-
fectiveness. This paper argued that these weaknesses can be compared to 
those highlighted in Zuboff’s exploration of “Surveillance Capitalism,” with 
the difference being that the weaknesses of China’s surveillance socialism 
arise from political failures rather than market failures.  
Lastly, this paper highlights how China’s BRI has the potential to ex-
tend and sustain China’s SCS beyond its borders. As the SCS continues to 
expand beyond China’s borders, it will come into conflict with alternative 
Western data ecosystems built on very different values, with very different 
understandings of socially responsible corporate behavior. The ultimate dan-
ger being that China’s SCS is built upon a Communist Party controlled sys-
tem that shapes CSR for its own ends, and to suit its own vision of socially 
responsible corporate behavior. 
